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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Sandy, the destructive superstorm that had a 
devastating impact in New York City and other parts of the Northeast-
ern U.S. in 2012, ideas and data proliferate about how coastal cities, 
such as New York, can pursue strategies of resilience to help withstand 
the next weather-related onslaught.1 These ideas include the reality 
that the city’s response must take account of the vulnerable populations 
at its periphery.2 Superstorm Sandy put a face to their vulnerability, 
including 6,800 evacuees assigned to shelters, 1,800 of whom were resi-
dents of chronic care facilities located in flood zones.3 The vulnerable 
                                                     
 1. See LINDA I. GIBBS & CASWELL F. HOLLOWAY, NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER 
ACTION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG 1 (2013) [here-
inafter NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 27. 
 3. Id. at 17–18.  
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also included countless numbers of elderly and disabled people, and non-
English speakers, who were stranded in New York City Housing Au-
thority-owned buildings without electricity, heat, and hot water for 
weeks as a consequence of storm surges that flooded basement-level 
heating and electrical systems.4 Crucially, forty-five percent of the 
Housing Authority’s buildings are located in evacuation zones near the 
waterfront;5 the siting of these buildings, and particularly their high-
rise, tower-in-the-park design, reflect key features of mid-century hous-
ing policies informed by slum clearance goals, a post-World War II hous-
ing shortage, and considerations of cost.6 
In its June 2013 report, A Stronger, More Resilient New York, the 
city embraced a comprehensive set of proposals reflecting two principal 
strategies to achieve resilience in the event of another serious storm: 
protection, including hard and soft armoring of the coastline, buildings, 
and key infrastructure; and accommodation, including the use of the 
city’s zoning and building regulatory authority to improve resilience 
when sea levels rise.7 At the same time, however, the city has continued 
to champion waterfront development,8 a commitment the city’s report 
confirmed.9 In pledging to rebuild damaged or destroyed structures and 
infrastructure, the city disavowed reliance on another recognized ap-
proach to preparing for weather disasters: managed retreat from coastal 
areas that are particularly vulnerable to flooding and other storm-
related damage.10 In a section of the report’s introduction entitled “What 
Resiliency Means,” the city asserted that it “cannot, and will not, re-
treat.”11 The report’s first unnumbered page also offers a pithy defini-
tion of resilience: “able to bounce back after change or adversity” and 
“capable of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from difficult 
conditions,” followed by “Syn.: Tough[.] See also: New York City.”12 
Although the report’s civic boosterism is forgivable, this article ar-
gues that whether the city in fact acts resiliently also must take into 
account the extent to which its proposals respond to the needs of vul-
                                                     
 4. Eric Lipton & Michael Moss, Housing Agency’s Flaws Revealed by Storm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-
agency-was-overwhelmed-after-storm.html?ref=nyregion. 
 5. Id. at 2.  
 6. Jonathan Mahler, How the Coastline Became a Place to Put the Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion/how-new-york-citys-
coastline-became-home-to-the-poor.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&; NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM, 
PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED 59, 62, 70–72, 130–131, 141 (2008). 
 7. CITY OF NEW YORK & MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT 
NEW YORK 47–48 (2013) [hereinafter A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml. 
 8. Annie Karni, Bloomberg Lays Out Post-Sandy Strategy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 
(Dec. 6, 2012, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20121206/REAL_ESTATE/121209942. 
 9. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7, at 7.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at cover page opposite Dedication of Report.  
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nerable people housed along its coastline, even if these responses entail 
strategies of managed retreat rather than, or in addition to, adaptive 
rebuilding.13 To develop this idea, Part II describes the major categories 
of Sandy’s impact in the city, and the city’s immediate responses, includ-
ing the launch of its Special Initiative on Rebuilding and Resiliency 
(SIRR). Part III will then consider the city’s disjointed rhetoric of resili-
ence, consisting of a popularized usage of the term coupled with a large-
ly unexplained application of a more specialized meaning of resilience as 
systems responsiveness. This part will deconstruct the city’s definition 
of resilience in relation to recognized conceptions of resilience developed 
in bio-ecological, international disaster relief, and psychological litera-
tures. 
Part IV will examine the city’s principal categories of resilience ini-
tiatives as reflected in A Stronger, More Resilient New York,14 as well as 
the report’s absence of discussion of managed retreat alternatives. Part 
V will examine the implications of New York City’s identification of re-
silience with rebuilding and continued waterfront development for its 
vulnerable (and typically less mobile) populations living in the water-
front areas. Drawing on a richer conception of resilience reflected in the 
disciplinary approaches discussed in Part III, it offers a conception of 
resilience emphasizing a city’s sovereign obligations grounded in law 
and social equity to anticipate and monitor the specific and ongoing 
needs of its more at-risk residents, recognizing the effects of socially-
influenced factors such as income and education disparities, race, and 
gender. 
To be sure, a city’s strategy of climate resilience should incorporate 
the following core elements: maintaining back-up capacity in key sys-
tems; responding flexibly to evolving conditions; limiting system failure 
or “domino” effect; ensuring the ability to rebound quickly; and integrat-
ing ongoing learning from experience.15 In considering both an appro-
priate definition for and potential strategies of resilience in the context 
of weather-related disasters, the article offers a conception of resilience 
that takes appropriate account of its social dimensions, and in particu-
lar, the needs of vulnerable populations.16 It argues that focusing atten-
tion on human vulnerability illuminates the risks of over-reliance on 
growth-oriented strategies and the importance of considered use of 
                                                     
 13. Id. at 31. 
 14. See generally A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7. 
 15. NYS 2100 COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE STRENGTH AND 
RESILIENCE OF THE EMPIRE STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE 25 (2013) [hereinafter NYS 2100 
COMMISSION], available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/documents/NYS2100.pdf. 
 16. See discussion infra Parts III, IV, IV. 
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managed coastal retreat as an alternative or additional strategy in resil-
ience planning.17 
Given the direct and immediate connection a municipality bears to 
coastal land, infrastructure, and the people who live and work within its 
borders, the article argues that resilience for a coastal city entails effec-
tive and replicable strategies by which a city government, through pub-
lic resources and by mobilizing the energies of community networks, 
prioritizes the wellbeing of its most vulnerable populations.18 Such rein-
forcement of the city’s “social infrastructure,” to borrow sociologist Eric 
Klinenberg’s phrase,19 should be a key ingredient of New York City’s, or 
any resilient city’s, response to the human costs of increasingly predict-
able weather-related disasters. At minimum, keeping the social dimen-
sions of weather disasters in view should counsel policy makers to re-
main open to a broader range of resilience strategies beyond a reflexive 
response to rebuild and “armor” coastal areas and infrastructure. 
II. SUPERSTORM SANDY’S IMPACT IN NEW YORK CITY 
A. The Toll 
The municipality of New York is a coastal city with 520 miles of 
waterfront.20 Three hundred seventy-five thousand New Yorkers reside 
in areas identified by the city at the time of the storm’s approach as 
Evacuation Zone A, land at high risk of flooding, and were ordered to 
evacuate.21 Among the health-care facilities located in Zone A are “six 
acute-care hospitals, one psychiatric hospital, twenty-two nursing 
homes, and eighteen adult care facilities.”22 Although an After Action 
Report prepared by New York City documents its efforts to encourage 
Housing Authority residents to comply with a mayoral evacuation order 
that applied to areas closest to the waterfront, there is mounting evi-
dence that the city and its Housing Authority underestimated the reach 
of the storm’s surges and its impact on high-rise residents.23 The storm, 
that struck New York City on the evening of October 29, 2012, reached 
                                                     
 17. Id.   
 18. Id.  
 19. Eric Klinenberg, Adaptation: How Can Cities be “Climate-Proofed”?, THE NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 7, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/01/07/130107fa_fact_klinenberg (“social infra-
structure: the people, places, and institutions that foster cohesion and support”). 
 20. NYS 2100 COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 40; The City of New York, Community 
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery: Partial Action Plan A 3 (2013) [hereinafter 
Partial Action Plan A], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/downloads/pdf/cdbg-
dr_full.pdf. 
 21. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.  
 22. Id.  
 23. E.g., id. (demonstrating how many high-rise residents actually were impacted 
by the storm).  
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properties, residences, and infrastructure in the city’s five boroughs lo-
cated beyond Zone A, flooding many of the city’s subways and tunnels.24 
The storm’s toll included forty-three deaths,25 the total loss of ap-
proximately 300 homes,26 800,000 New York City residents and busi-
nesses without power,27 the evacuation of five hospitals and thirty resi-
dential facilities that sustained flooding damage and power failures,28 
damage to 402 buildings covering 35,000 units of aging public housing 
stock owned by the New York City Housing Authority,29 and the as-
signment of 6,800 persons forced to evacuate their homes to seventy-
three city shelters.30 In addition to the total destruction of small resi-
dential properties located in coastal areas in the city’s boroughs of Stat-
en Island, Queens, and Brooklyn, more than 80,000 residents of New 
York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) high-rise buildings were strand-
ed without essential services for periods of time exceeding two weeks 
following the flooding of basements in which heating and electrical sys-
tems were located.31 The storm’s impact included: damage to fuel termi-
nals, pipelines, and fueling stations that led to fuel shortages requiring 
rationing;32 some 700,000 tons of refuse;33 extensive damage to board-
walk and waterfront structures;34 and the loss of “more than two million 
cubic yards of sand from city beaches.”35 
Meteorological analysis confirms that, as a storm system, Hurri-
cane Sandy was three times the width of Hurricane Katrina in New Or-
leans.36 A confluence of unusual weather occurrences—storm surge, 
high tide, wind velocity, and the storm’s directional shift—led to an idio-
syncratic event:37 Sandy’s arrival occurred during a full moon that con-
tributed to tides approximately five percent higher than what usually 
                                                     
 24. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7, at 11, 13–14. 
 25. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.  
 26. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 1. 
 27. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. 
 28. Id. at 8. 
 29. The Worker Inst., Union Leaders Agree on Need to Rebuild and Reform New 
York State’s Energy System, CORNELL U. ILR SCH. (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/workerinstitute/news/NYS-Energy-System.html.  
 30. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. 
 31. Sandy’s Effects on Housing in New York City, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & 
URB. POL’Y 4–5 (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.furmancenter.org/files/publications/SandysEffectsOnHousingInNYC.pdf. 
 32. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Id. at 23. 
 35. Id.  
 36. See Adam Voiland, Comparing the Winds of Sandy and Katrina, NASA (Nov. 6, 
2012), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79626&src=eoa-iotd. 
 37. Brooklyn Law School, Sparer Public Interest Law Forum, YOUTUBE (May 2, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxu3sgaiG1U (Seth W. Pinsky, President, NYC 
Econ. Dev. Corp., Keynote Address at the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest Law Forum). 
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would occur.38 In addition, the storm had taken a “leftward hook” over 
New Jersey and subjected New York City to particularly strong winds.39 
These factors led to the dramatic storm surge and waves that inundated 
many waterfront neighborhoods, notably the Rockaways, Midland Beach 
in Staten Island; Coney Island and Gerritsen Beach in Brooklyn; Or-
chard Beach in the Bronx; and the South Street Seaport in Lower Man-
hattan. At the southern tip of Manhattan, water levels at the Battery 
rose to fourteen feet.40 
B. Immediate Response 
New York City has estimated that the steps it took in readiness for 
and in response to Superstorm Sandy represented one of the most ex-
tensive efforts to engage and deliver city services that the city has ever 
documented.41 To prepare for the storm, the city implemented its 
Coastal Storm Plan, including centers for emergency operations, 
healthcare evacuation, and logistics.42 In addition to ordering the evacu-
ation of Zone A, before the storm hit, the city and Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority closed down the subway system to move cars and 
equipment to higher elevations and forestall the effects of flooding.43 
The city reported a series of steps that the housing authority took to 
alert its tenants to the mayor’s evacuation order for Zone A, including 
33,000 phone calls to 19,000 units, posting multilingual flyers, knocking 
on the apartment doors of thousands of seniors and persons with disa-
bilities, and, with the New York City Police Department, using bull-
horns and vehicles with flashing lights to announce the evacuation or-
der, supplying 200 buses to help transport housing authority residents 
out of evacuation Zone A.44 Nevertheless, many housing authority resi-
dents remained in their apartments.45 After the storm struck, the city, 
in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), assigned ap-
                                                     
 38. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 3. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1. 
 42. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. The city has 
also had in place since 2007 a long–term sustainability planning document, PlaNYC 2030, 
updated in 2011, which includes a six-prong plan to address climate change. In addition to 
lowering greenhouse gas emissions, the plan calls for evaluating “vulnerabilities and risks 
from climate change,” improving the “resilience” of structures and communities, promoting 
public health, and enhancing the city’s “preparedness” for severe weather conditions. 
PLANYC, PLANYC 2011: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK, CHAPTER ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3 
(2011) [hereinafter A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK], available at 
http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_2011_climate_change.pdf  
 43. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 4. 
 44. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 45. Id. at 9. The results of a later survey of housing authority residents indicated 
that those surveyed who remained with knowledge that they were in an evacuation zone 
believed either that their buildings were not in danger or were structurally sound enough to 
withstand the storm. Id.  
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proximately 230 generators on a priority basis to hospitals, nursing 
homes, large multi-family buildings, and housing authority develop-
ments in the days following the storm.46 
The city worked with local utilities to keep apprised of the extent of 
electrical power loss, which continued for approximately five days before 
power was returned to southern Manhattan.47 However, many residenc-
es and businesses in the outer boroughs were without power for signifi-
cantly longer periods of time.48 Heat, hot water, and electric power were 
fully returned to all housing authority buildings on November 18.49 
For evacuated persons housed in emergency shelters and unable to 
return to their homes, the city contracted with hotels to provide short-
term evacuation sheltering,50 which the city continued until October, 
when FEMA reimbursements ended.51 Working with FEMA, the city 
inaugurated NYC Rapid Repairs, a program to restore power, heat, and 
hot water to private homes at no cost to the homeowners.52 It was pro-
jected that the program would repair more than 11,700 homes consist-
ing of more than 20,000 units.53 The City’s Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (DEP) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
pumped out many departmental facilities, including wastewater treat-
ment plants, and worked closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
and the U.S. Navy to pump out other infrastructure, including subways, 
tunnels, and street underpasses.54 
                                                     
 46. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. 
 47. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 3. 
 48. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. 
 49. Id.  
 50. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 4. 
 51. Mireya Navarro, Hundreds of Storm Evacuees in Hotels Face Evictions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/nyregion/hundreds-of-storm-
evacuees-in-hotels-face-evictions.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0. Thereafter, the Red Cross made 
funds available to allow these evacuated persons to remain in hotels as they sought replace-
ment housing. Some NYC Sandy Victims Remain in Hotels Thanks to Red Cross, CBS NEW 
YORK (Oct. 5, 2013, 10:49 AM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/10/05/some-nyc-sandy-
victims-remain-in-hotels-thanks-to-red-cross/. 
 52. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 5. 
 53. Id. The program generated some complaints of unprofessional work, and repairs 
exposing homeowners to unsafe conditions. See, e.g., Marc Santia, Violations Found in 
Sandy-Damaged Homes Repaired Though City Program, CHANNEL FOUR NBC NEW YORK 
NEWS (May 16, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Staten-Island-
Residents-Allege-Shoddy-Rapid-Repairs-From-New-York-City-Program-for-Sandy-Damaged-
Homes-207646261.html; Tara Palmeri, Homeowners Blast Shoddy Repairs by Contractors 
Through FEMA’s Rapid Repairs Program, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2013, 
http://nypost.com/2013/01/28/homeowners-blast-shoddy-repairs-by-contractors-through-
femas-rapid-repairs-program/. 
 54. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 4. 
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Three days after the storm hit, the city and the National Guard es-
tablished a food and water distribution center,55 and one day after that 
established a fueling service for city vehicles, para-transit vehicles, and 
other first responders and recovery-related personnel.56 To address 
health care needs, the city circulated eleven mobile medical vans to pro-
vide primary care and prescriptions to adults and children in the Rock-
aways, Brooklyn, and Staten Island.57 The City, National Guard, and 
volunteers assisted the housing authority and other agencies to provide 
services to homebound persons.58 The housing authority began drop-offs 
of food, and health checks for homebound residents on November 1 and 
reported that fourteen of seventeen food and water distribution areas 
were located near housing authority developments.59 Despite these ini-
tiatives, the housing authority and other government agencies were un-
able to provide timely and adequate aid to many stranded residents; 
instead, members of resident associations within housing authority 
complexes and other autonomous community-based groups such as Peo-
ple’s Relief and Occupy Sandy stepped into the breach to ensure that 
these residents received medical care, warm clothing, food, and water.60 
The city opened Disaster Assistance Service Centers (DASCs) in 
areas that sustained extensive damage—Coney Island, the Rockaways, 
Staten Island, and Breezy Point—on Friday, November 2, four days af-
ter the storm.61 Fifteen days after the storm, then Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg opened the first of nine Restoration Centers, described by the 
city as “one-stop-shops” for city, state, and federal resources for persons 
and businesses heavily affected by the storm.62 In operation for approx-
imately three months, the Restoration Centers concentrated on three 
areas: financial assistance, housing, and reconstruction.63 
To support the recovery of businesses, the city created five Busi-
ness Recovery Zones (BRZs) to centralize city resources and programs 
and offered low-interest loans and grants to businesses that sustained 
losses from flooding or power failures.64 The city, through the New York 
City Industrial Development Authority (IDA), also waived some city and 
state sales taxes for the purchase of materials needed for rebuilding or 
other recovery.65 
                                                     
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Id. at 5. 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Id. at 5–6. 
 59. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. 
 60. Daniel Marans, In Coney Island Public Housing, People’s Relief and Local Resi-
dents Fill Void Left by Government, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-marans/hurricane-sandy-peoples-
relief_b_2128733.html. 
 61. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. 
 62. Id. at 28. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 30–31. 
 65. Id. at 30. 
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C. Interim Steps to Recovery 
After the storm, the city initiated various reviews and measures in-
tended both to help assess its preparedness for Superstorm Sandy and 
to plan to develop capacity for future weather events.66 Most immediate-
ly, the city put together a plan sketching out its planned use of Commu-
nity Development Block Grant funds to be made available under a fed-
eral relief package.67 The city also produced an After Action Report look-
ing back as well as forward to take account of the systems in place or 
those needed to enhance readiness to respond.68 And a report issued in 
June 2013 as the culmination of the City’s Special Initiative on Rebuild-
ing and Resiliency (SIRR), headed by the New York City Economic De-
velopment Corporation, formulated mid- and long-term rebuilding plans 
for New York City.69 
1. Application for Community Development Block Grant Funds 
On January 29, 2013, exactly three months after the date Hurri-
cane Sandy struck the New York region, President Obama signed the 
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, which includes $16 billion70 
in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Recovery funds ad-
ministered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) to cover “necessary expenses related to disaster relief, long-term 
recovery, restoration of infrastructure and housing, and economic revi-
talization in the most impacted and distressed areas resulting from . . . 
Hurricane Sandy and other eligible events in calendar years 2011, 2012, 
and 2013.”71 The city’s allocation under the HUD’s first distribution of 
CDBG-DR funds was $1,772,820,000,72 and the federal government ap-
proved the city’s plans for use of those funds.73 The city allocated $648 
                                                     
 66. See NYC Recovery: Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery, 
NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/html/home/home.shtml (last visited April 16, 2014) 
[hereinafter NYC Recovery]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1 
(stating that “[t]he City’s response to Hurricane Sandy began well before the storm and con-
tinues today, but we are far enough away from the immediate events of October and Novem-
ber 2012 to evaluate the City’s performance to understand what went well and—as another 
hurricane season approaches—what can be improved.”). Id. at 1.  
 69. See generally A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7 (stating 
“[w]e will make New York a stronger, more resilient city.”). Id. at 7. 
 70. NYC Recovery, supra note 67. 
 71. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat 4, 35–36, 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ2/pdf/PLAW-113publ2.pdf. 
 72. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 139. 
 73. Mireya Navarro, City to Begin Distributing Storm Aid This Summer, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2013, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/city-
plans-to-dispense-nearly-2-billion-in-hurricane-aid-starting-this-summer.html?_r=0. 
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million for housing programs, $293 million for business programs, $360 
million for infrastructure and other city services, $294 million in resili-
ence investments, and $177 million in citywide administration and 
planning.74 In addition to this allocation of CDBG monies, the New York 
City has had access to other federal funding, including grants from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Small Business Administra-
tion Disaster Loans, National Flood Insurance Program disbursements, 
and other funds payable through the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act 
of 2013, as well as private insurance payouts, loans, and grants from the 
private (for profit and nonprofit) sector.75 
2. The City’s After Action Report 
Developed by the New York City Mayor’s Office, an assessment of 
after action working sessions and discussions with community partners 
produced fifty-nine recommendations in the categories of communica-
tions, evacuations, public safety, general and special medical needs shel-
tering, response and recovery logistics, community recovery services, 
and ongoing recovery.76 The report organized the recommendations into 
seven discrete areas, emphasizing the need to improve the city’s capaci-
ty to address the material and informational needs of its populace and 
to mobilize and coordinate relief efforts, including the provision of hous-
ing necessitated by storm-related relocations.77 
The report disaggregated data pertaining to the impact of the 
storm on the New York City Housing Authority buildings and systems, 
and building residents.78 In a tacit recognition of deficits in the city’s 
systems to address the needs of vulnerable and homebound people, the 
                                                     
 74. Mike Bloomberg, NYC’s Plan for Hurricane Sandy Recovery Initiatives Ap-
proved, MIKEBLOOMBERG.COM (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=8F8A0649-C29C-7CA2-
FED3D73B2EBF744C.  
 75. PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 20, at 32–36. 
 76. NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 77. Id. The report’s executive summary specified the following initiatives: “I. Im-
proved evacuation, including updated evacuation zones and better, clearer communication to 
help New Yorkers understand how to protect themselves from the risk of severe weather. II. 
Improved accessibility of all coastal storm-related information and services to make them 
available to all New Yorkers, including persons with disabilities or special medical needs, 
homebound populations, non-English speakers, and undocumented immigrants. III. Better 
integration of the City’s data across platforms and agencies to increase situational awareness 
and allow more targeted, efficient response and recovery operations. IV. Additional capacity 
to respond to large-scale building inundation and loss of power, including pre-storm identifi-
cation of the equipment and skilled resources likely to be needed for building restoration and 
better coordination with private building owners. V. Better coordination of relief to affected 
areas and to vulnerable or homebound populations, including more efficient deployment of 
volunteers and donations to residents and business owners. VI. The development of a mid- to 
long-term housing plan for New Yorkers displaced by damage from coastal storms. VII. 
Partnership with the federal and state authorities that regulate and enforce standards for 
private companies and utilities that provide essential services to New York City residents.” 
Id. 
 78. See id. 
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report included a chapter on Community Recovery Services with rec-
ommendations to institutionalize outreach and collaboration with com-
munity organizations and volunteers, including a “vulnerable popula-
tions/homebound door-to-door service Task Force and Action Plan.”79 An 
appendix featured a survey of city residents living in Evacuation Zone 
A, designed to determine the extent to which they complied with, or oth-
erwise responded to, the mayor’s evacuation order, in the interest of im-
proving levels of compliance in the future.80 With its emphasis on recon-
structing and assessing the city’s response, this storm-related report (to 
a greater extent than the others the city has produced) focused attention 
on the human services dimension of its response.81 
3. The Special Initiative on Rebuilding and Resiliency 
Headed by the then New York City Economic Development Corpo-
ration President Seth Pinsky, the Special Initiative was charged with 
developing a mid- and long-term rebuilding plan accounting for climate 
change based on an analysis of the events and impact of Sandy (docu-
menting what occurred and assessing why it occurred), what could even-
tuate, and how to rebuild and plan for climate change.82 The SIRR mobi-
lized multiple stakeholders to gain insight into how to proceed.83 Indi-
cating its “public engagement,” the report states that it consulted with 
more than thirty federal, state, and city government agencies, commu-
nicated with elected officials and community board members, conferred 
with more than 320 business and community-based organizations, held 
eleven public workshops, and did outreach to more than a 1,000 per-
sons.84 
With a ceremonious launch in June 2013,85 the SIRR’s report, A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York, published under the auspices of 
PlaNYC 2030, the city’s blueprint for sustainable planning, announced 
that the “underlying goal of [the] report is resiliency.”86 In a subsequent 
post by the City’s Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability, the 
                                                     
 79. Id. at 25, 27, 30. 
 80. Id. at Appendix B. 
 81. See generally id. (stating that “[t]he recommendations in this report also focus 
on the ways the City can improve emergency response to help New Yorkers resume their 
lives and get back to work.”). Id. at 5.  
 82. Brooklyn Law School, supra note 37. 
 83. Id. 
 84. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7, at 5. 
 85. See A Stronger, More Resilient, New York: An Ambitious Proposal to Protect 
the City Against the Effects of Climate Change, NYCEDC (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.nycedc.com/blog-entry/stronger-more-resilient-new-york-ambitious-proposal-
protect-city-against-effects-climate. 
 86. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7, at 6. 
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report was described as “not just a road map for long-term comprehen-
sive resiliency planning for New York, but for cities worldwide.”87 The 
report’s use of resilience/resiliency draws on popular understandings of 
the term and generally uses it in a way that assumes a unitary mean-
ing.88 And, with limited discussion of alternative strategies, the report 
equates resilience with rebuilding.89 Part III will examine the city’s use 
of resilience in its post-Sandy and related climate change discourse and 
situate this usage in relation to a range of disciplines and practices that 
incorporate more nuanced and relevant understandings of resilience. 
III. RESILIENCE AS A DISCOURSE 
The key to New York City’s projected post-Sandy expenditures out-
lined in the CDBG-DR Partial Action Plan A, and in its principal plan-
ning document, A Stronger, More Resilient New York, has been the as-
serted goal of implementing a set of plans and initiatives that ensure 
the city’s resiliency.90 The concept of resilience/resiliency is also a core 
feature of the section on climate change in the city’s PlaNYC and related 
documents, such as Vision 2020: New York City Comprehensive Water-
front Plan.91 Understanding what resilience means in the era of climate 
change is thus crucial to the analysis of the steps the city has undertak-
en or plans as it addresses the continued prospect of weather-related 
disasters. 
A. Deconstructing Resilience 
As a concept, resilience is highly developed in the psychological and 
ecological sciences, though the concept has also become more salient in 
the fields of international aid, disaster planning, management, and gov-
ernance, including planning that specifically addresses climate 
change.92 A recent Rockefeller Foundation-funded literature review of 
resilience across disciplines has identified three principal frameworks in 
which resilience is discussed: engineering resilience, which, in its con-
cern with the capacity to withstand external disturbances and to return 
                                                     
 87. C40 Cities, A Stronger, More Resilient New York, C40CITIES BLOG (July 26, 
2013), http://c40.org/c40blog/a-stronger-more-resilient-new-york. 
 88. See generally A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 7 (stating 
that “[t]he underlying goal of this report is resiliency. That is, to adapt our city to the impacts 
of climate change and to seek to ensure that, when nature overwhelms our defenses from 
time to time, we are able to recover more quickly.”). Id. at 6.  
 89. See generally id. at 7 (stating that “a resilient city is one that is . . . able to 
bounce back more quickly when [its] defenses are breached from time to time.”). 
 90. See id. at Foreword from the Mayor. 
 91. See, e.g., A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK, supra note 43; CITY OF NEW YORK, 
VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN (2011) [hereinafter 
VISION 2020], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020_nyc_cwp.pdf. 
 92. PATRICK MARTIN-BREEN & J. MARTY ANDERIES, RESILIENCE: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 4–5, 42–43 (2011), available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/resilience-
literature-review.  
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rapidly to a normal state, accords with “colloquial” and “intuitive” con-
ceptions of resilience;93 systems resilience, which refers to the ability of 
a system to maintain its functions in the face of a disturbance;94 and 
complex adaptive systems resilience, which includes the capacity to de-
vise new ways of working, or reorganizing, when a disturbance occurs.95 
In psychology, evolving definitions have shifted emphasis from a 
more static, outcome-focused conception to an understanding of resili-
ence as a dynamic process involving “positive adaptation in the context 
of significant adversity,” a process that accords with a systems frame-
work.96 Psychological analyses of resilience appear in the literature of 
child development and family relations.97 However, psychological resili-
ence also applies in discussions of responses to trauma and disaster, and 
thus overlaps in some respects with disaster planning literature.98 
Discussions of resilience in ecological systems increasingly conjoin 
the ecological with the social, recognizing the impact of human activity 
on natural ecosystems.99 One inclusive definition of resilience encom-
passes the “ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances 
while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the 
capacity for self-organisation [sic], and the capacity to adapt to stress 
and change.”100 Another application of resilience emphasizes the inter-
action between the social and the ecological systems, particularly the 
human capacity to turn to nature and realize an “ecological identity” as 
a mechanism of recovery after an extreme circumstance: 
The ways in which we as humans reorganize, learn, recover and 
demonstrate resilience through remembering and operationaliz-
ing the value of our relationships with elements of our shared 
ecologies in the direst of circumstances such as disaster and war 
hold clues to how we might increase human resilience to new 
                                                     
 93. Id. at 5–6, 43. 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 6–7, 15–23 (demonstrating the framework of systems resilience 
in ecological and social-ecological systems). 
 95. Id. at 7–8, 45–46. 
 96. Id. at 44–45. 
 97. Id. at 34–36. 
 98. Id. at 23–24. 
 99. Id. at 15–17. 
100. U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., DEFINING DISASTER RESILIENCE: A DFID APPROACH 
PAPER 6 (2011) [hereinafter DEFINING DISASTER RESILIENCE: A DFID APPROACH PAPER], 
available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Defining%20Disaster%20Resilience%20
A%20DFID%20Approach%20Paper%20%28new%20cover%29.pdf (quoting the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change). 
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surprises, while contributing sources of social-ecological resili-
ence to ecosystems.101 
In the international aid context, resilience refers to the capacity of 
a nation, community, or household unit to resist and recover from a dis-
aster.102 The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduc-
tion defines resilience as the “ability of a system, community or society 
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from 
the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner.”103 
In the specific context of climate change, resilience has been de-
fined as: 
The capacity of an individual, community, or institution to dy-
namically and effectively respond to shifting climate impact cir-
cumstances while continuing to function at an acceptable level. 
Simply put, it is the ability to survive and recover from the ef-
fects of climate change. It includes the ability to understand po-
tential impacts and to take appropriate action before, during, 
and after a particular consequence to minimize negative effects 
and maintain the ability to respond to changing conditions.104 
Climate change resilience encompasses adaptation and recovery 
strategies and presumes “systems [that] build redundancies of re-
sources, multiple response paths, and safety nets.”105 
In a similar vein, a preliminary report of the New York State 2100 
Commission, recommending steps to protect the state’s infrastructure 
from weather-related disasters, defines resilience as: 
The ability of a system to withstand shocks and stresses while 
still maintaining its essential functions. Therefore systems that 
are more vulnerable – i.e., those that are brittle, at stretched ca-
pacity, or with very low diversity – are more at risk of cata-
strophic consequences when the next shock event happens. Re-
silient systems are also better able to repair and recover after-
wards. 
Taken together, there are several features that are common to most 
resilient systems, including having spare or latent capacity (redundan-
cy); ensuring flexibility and responsiveness; managing for safe failure 
                                                     
101. Keith Tidball, Mechanisms of Resilience & Other ‘Re-Words’ in Urban Green-
ing, NATURE OF CITIES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.thenatureofcities.com/2013/04/24/. 
mechanisms-of-resilience-other-re-words-in-urban-greening/. 
102. DEFINING DISASTER RESILIENCE: A DFID APPROACH PAPER, supra note 101, at 
6.  
103. Id. 
104. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, BUILDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter BUILDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE], available at 
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/c9725eb2-b76e-42eb-82db-c5672a43a097-
climate.pdf. 
105. Id. at 3. 
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(building resistance to domino effects); and having the capacity to recov-
er quickly and evolve over time – to thrive, not just survive major dis-
ruptions.106 
B. The City’s Discourse of Resilience 
New York City’s discussion of resilience in PlaNYC invokes the 
plan’s overarching focus on sustainability.107 For example, PlaNYC’s 
chapter on climate change includes two of six goals specifically tied to 
resilience, one addressed to buildings, infrastructure, and coastal pro-
tection,108 and the other related to communities.109 In a recent update to 
PlaNYC, the city has included twenty-nine “Sustainability Indicators” 
consisting of metrics and targets in a range of categories (housing, 
parks, brownfields, waterways, water supply transportation, energy, air 
quality, solid waste, and climate change).110 The goal/metric for climate 
change is to “increase the resilience of our communities, natural sys-
tems, and infrastructure to climate risks.”111 Initiatives to enhance cli-
mate resilience in buildings, transportation, housing, parks, waterways, 
and energy are specifically tied to sustainability.112 
Certainly, resilience and sustainability are connected ideas;113 sus-
tainability has been described as a more encompassing term related to 
concerns of preserving resources over the longer term, though the at-
tribute of resilience can foster sustainability, particularly in the face of 
disturbances recurring over time.114 Sustainability, however, is itself a 
supple term used in “bio-scientific” contexts,115 concerned with limits on 
available resources, and also in a “political-economic” sense.116 Anthro-
pologist Melissa Checker has argued that, in New York City, a “dis-
course of sustainability” related to “green” urban planning is, in effect, a 
form of governance that presents as a “technocratic, politically neutral 
                                                     
106. NYS 2100 COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 24. 
107. See A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK, supra note 43, at 151. 
108. Id. (Goal: “Increase the resilience of the city’s built and natural environments.”). 
109. Id. (Goal: “Create resilient communities though [sic] public information and 
outreach.”). 
110. Id. at 178–79. 
111. Id. at 179. 
112. See id.at 152, 154. 
113. See Ezio Manzini, Small, Local, Open and Connected: Resilient Systems and 
Sustainable Qualities,  CHANGE OBSERVER (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://changeobserver.designobserver.com/feature/small-local-open-and-connected-resilient-
systems-and-sustainable-qualities/37670/. 
114. MARTIN-BREEN & ANDERIES, supra note 93, at 14. 
115. Gary McDonogh, Cindy Isenhour & Melissa Checker, Introduction: Sustainabil-
ity in the City: Ethnographic Approaches, 23 CITY & SOC’Y 113, 113–14 (2011). 
116. Id. at 114 (quoting Erik Swyngedouw, The Post-Political Condition and the En-
vironment 2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript)). 
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approach to solving environmental problems.”117 The very “ubiquity and 
ambiguity of sustainability,” she and other commentators suggest, 
threaten to overwhelm its ecological/environmental meaning and to 
blunt its association with environmental justice considerations.118 For 
example, the fact that sustainability has been the catchphrase of the 
city’s growth-oriented initiatives119 reveals its susceptibility to overuse 
and a resulting loss of meaning. 
The centrality of resilience to the city’s official discourse concerning 
climate change and weather disasters exhibits a similar broadening, 
and blunting, of the term. As discussed, in the climate change context, 
resilience refers to the capacity of systems to adapt to climate change, 
including sea level rise.120 Vision 2020, the city’s comprehensive water-
front plan issued under the auspices of PlaNYC, describes climate resil-
ience as “[a]daptations to our environment to increase the city’s ability 
to withstand and recover quickly from weather-related events.”121 A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York defines a resilient city as “one that 
is: first, protected by effective defenses and adapted to mitigate most 
climate impacts; and second, able to bounce back more quickly when 
those defenses are breached from time to time.”122 These definitions ac-
cord with a systems function framework for analyzing resilience.123 
As noted, resilience also refers to the capacity of humans to respond 
to challenging circumstances, a concept that has been developed in the 
psychological and international aid literature.124 The city’s post-Sandy 
climate change discourse adapts and popularizes this usage by equating 
resilience with the idea of fortitude, tenacity, and resolve (“In short, we 
have to be tough. And toughness, as we all know, is one of the defining 
traits of New Yorkers.”).125 Resilience is also linked to a “can do” mind-
set (“Out of the heartbreaking catastrophe that was Sandy has come 
this can-do, must-do, will-do plan.”).126 In these usages, the city adopts a 
more colloquial approach to the term and only rarely refers to the specif-
ic, discipline-based meanings that resilience has accrued in relation to 
climate science and systems analysis. Like the city’s discourse of sus-
tainability, the city’s principal post-Sandy resilience text tends to con-
flate these meanings with a discourse that is part motivational and part 
urban-boosterism, and tied to the city’s commitment to continued water-
front development. 
                                                     
117. Melissa Checker, Wiped Out by the “Greenwave”: Environmental Gentrification 
and the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability, 23 CITY & SOC’Y 210, 212 (2011). 
118. McDonogh, Isenhour & Checker, supra note 116, at 113; id. at 212. 
119. See Checker, supra note 118, at 220–21. 
120. See VISION 2020, supra note 92, at 110. 
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123. See MARTIN-BREEN & ANDERIES, supra note 93, at 7. 
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at 8. 
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IV. A SPECTRUM OF RESILIENCE STRATEGIES: WHAT THE CITY 
CAN DO 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s White Paper on Building Climate 
Change Resilience, published in 2009, now seems particularly prescient, 
as it noted New York City’s particular climate challenges: climate mod-
eling had pointed to New York’s vulnerability to storm surges, hurri-
canes, and flooding.127 Moreover, the White Paper recognized a critical 
geographic fact that was implicated in post-Sandy recovery efforts: New 
York City’s density and limited land mass, the White Paper predicted, 
would complicate post-disaster housing options, such as mobile 
homes.128 
As climate scientists confirm, warming climates result in sea level 
rises that lead to storm surges.129 As a coastal city facing sea level rise, 
a municipality such as New York City is clearly vulnerable. In 2009, the 
New York City Panel on Climate Change, a body of climate, legal, and 
risk management specialists called into being by then New York City 
Mayor Bloomberg, issued a report projecting as “extremely likely” a 
mean annual sea level rise in New York of between two to five inches by 
the 2020s and a mean annual rise of between seven to twelve inches by 
the 2050s.130 A 2011 study by scientists at the Lamont-Doherty Earth 
Observatory of Columbia University, assessing the relationship of cli-
mate-induced sea level rise to storm surges and flooding in the New 
York City Metropolitan area, highlighted in particular the need to de-
velop strategies to address the risks of surges to transportation infra-
structure: 
We submit that the rising awareness of an increased climate-
change-related risk exposure for the region’s infrastructure (and 
of other assets as well) can provide the overdue impetus to de-
                                                     
127. BUILDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE, supra note 105, at 5. 
128. Id. See also NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 
(noting the City’s assignment of evacuees to local hotels over a protracted period while these 
individuals sought appropriate housing alternatives). For a further discussion of the difficul-
ties encountered by residents of the City’s hotel program, see Nabila Taj, In the Wake of 
Superstorm Sandy, Rebuild or Retreat? 8–9 (Dec. 2013) (student paper on file with the au-
thor). 
129. See, e.g., SEAS Expert Weighs in on Hurricane Sandy, COLUMBIA ENGINEERING 
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://engineering.columbia.edu/columbia-engineering-atmospheric-expert-
weighs-hurricane-sandy. See also NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
RISK INFORMATION 2013: OBSERVATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS, AND MAPS, 14–16 
(2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/ 
npcc_climate_risk_information_2013_report.pdf. 
130. NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 3 
(2009) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf.  
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velop and implement effective coping strategies and overcome 
the past tendency of risk denial by both private and public sec-
tors. Although there is quantifiable uncertainty associated with 
the expected increase in risk, it becomes clear that even without 
climate-change-related increments of risk, coping strategies are 
needed because the volume and aggregate value of exposed as-
sets are increasing with time. The uncertainty of the exact in-
crement of risk due to sea level rise and global warming can 
therefore not serve as an excuse to avoid dealing with the re-
gion’s storm surge risk. The coping strategies to be explored are 
likely to include a mixture of modern engineering solutions, reg-
ulatory measures, taxation and/or financial or insurance dis-
counting, and—as the ultimate tool—innovative land use com-
bined with buyouts and relocations. Costs and benefits of these 
various options, including the mounting costs of not facing these 
issues at all, need to be addressed quantitatively in forthcoming 
studies. They could not be resolved in this initial phase of as-
sessment. This assessment does however clearly show the mag-
nitudes of problems that will need to be tackled.131 
In a post-Sandy interview, the Columbia study’s lead author, Klaus 
Jacob, emphasized the need for regional land use policies rather than 
the application of the municipal home rule, which in New York State 
generally permits local governments to regulate land use and develop-
ment.132 The recommendation for a regional approach was seconded by 
the state-level NYS 2100 Commission’s preliminary report addressing 
ideas to improve the resilience of New York State’s infrastructure,133 
and also by the report of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 
chaired by Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun Do-
novan.134 
                                                     
131. KLAUS H. JACOB, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND A GLOBAL CITY: AN ASSESSMENT 
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The city’s own waterfront plan, Vision 2020, (released the same 
year as the Columbia study) called for balanced action on climate resili-
ence by considering risk of loss to properties and persons resulting from 
floods, the ecological benefits of allowing wetlands development in 
coastal areas, as well as other “public priorities such as waterfront ac-
cess and economic development.”135 The plan assumed that there would 
be “an opportunity for planning, with periodic re-evaluation of risks and 
strategies as climate science evolves,” relying on projections that, at the 
time, predicted more extensive effects of sea level rise and flooding in 
the 2050s.136 These assumptions were called into question in June 2013, 
however, when the New York City Panel on Climate Change released a 
report revising and increasing its earlier projections of sea level rise; 
these included mid-range projections of between four and eight inches 
by the 2020s with a high estimate of eleven inches, and by the 2050s, 
mid-range projections of between eleven and twenty-four inches, with a 
high estimate of thirty-one inches.137 
Whether the resilience strategies adopted are at a local or regional 
level, a range of options are available to New York City and its environs 
to plan for, mitigate, and otherwise adapt to risks presented by global 
warming and sea level rise. These potential responses fall broadly into 
three categories that have been described as protection, accommodation, 
and managed retreat measures;138 and implicate the full range of a city’s 
sovereign powers—police, eminent domain, and where needed to sup-
plement intergovernmental aid, revenue-raising powers.139 However, as 
discussed more fully below, the city has mainly rejected retreat 
measures. Recalling its use of the discourse of resilience, the city has 
slipped into the colloquial use of the term “retreat” as a surrendering to 
climate change and abandonment of the coastline, which runs the risk of 
overwhelming the word’s more specific meaning as an urban land use 
policy and strategy for responding to climate change. 
Typically, protection strategies include “hard armoring” mecha-
nisms (such as sea walls, bulkheads, levees, and riprap or revetments) 
which entail installing large boulders or concrete structures at shore-
lines, and “soft armoring” such as the use of wetlands or sand dunes to 
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create natural buffers.140 In Sandy’s aftermath, ideas for innovative pro-
tection-based coastal initiatives are beginning to appear. A consortium 
of architects and planners spearheaded by New York’s chapter of the 
American Institute of Architects released a report that, among other 
things, has proposed experimental measures to protect New York City’s 
waterfront,141 including: seawalls and wave walls that weaken and 
break up storm surges; model waterfront districts with “distributed” 
energy, waste, sewer, and water systems; floating habitats; natural and 
armored dunes of various materials; and incorporated wind and hydro-
power into waterfront buildings and infrastructure.142 
The city’s initiatives in A Stronger, More Resilient New York in-
clude a variety of hard armoring protective proposals, including in-
stalling revetments and bulkhead repairs to raise coastal edge eleva-
tions, adding storm surge barriers in Newtown Creek (a Superfund 
site),143 and floodwalls or levees in various locations to protect against 
storm surge.144 The city is also pursuing soft initiatives involving dunes 
and wetlands to slow down erosion and break down wave action.145 In a 
related development, New York City is currently soliciting expressions 
of interest from collaborators to finance a pilot “wetlands mitigation 
bank” in the borough of Staten Island.146 The bank is an arrangement 
that allows those seeking to develop waterfront property to purchase 
credits to finance restoration and maintenance of a pre-identified wet-
lands mitigation site,147 which, in turn, can perform a valuable ecologi-
cal function by serving as a natural storm barrier.148 The idea would be 
to assign credits to builders participating in wetlands projects that 
would, in turn, be sold to developers of coastal land “in other parts of 
Staten Island.”149 By financing the wetlands restoration the purchased 
credits would, it is thought, balance the environmental effects of the 
credit purchasers’ own coastal development.150 
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Accommodation measures, on the other hand, use a municipality’s 
existing zoning and building code regulatory authority to improve resili-
ence to sea level rise.151 Possibilities include changing foundation height 
levels, requiring the placement of electrical and other critical systems at 
substantially higher elevations in structures near coastal areas,152 as 
well as redesign of subway entrances and ventilation methods to avoid 
or reduce the risk of flooding.153 New York has incorporated ideas along 
these lines in A Stronger, More Resilient New York, including various 
proposals to amend the zoning and construction codes and retrofit public 
housing, hospitals, and nursing homes to increase their resilience to 
flooding.154 
Retreat mechanisms typically bar or limit development in flood-
prone areas.155 By directing development away from areas at risk of 
surges and flooding, they avoid thwarting the inland movement of eco-
systems. For example, “rolling development” links land-use tools to a 
shifting mean high tideline to ensure that development is adapted to 
rising sea levels.156 Other approaches include: government buyouts of 
developed property in flood-vulnerable areas, use of the land instead for 
open space or wetlands, allowing sale of development rights by property 
owners in flood-prone areas to owners in nearby locations, and conserva-
tion easements in which government gains a right to restrict develop-
ment of property owned by others.157 The value of these measures in-
cludes cost savings because non-development obviates the need for up-
keep of coastal structures and limits the occasion for loss or harm from 
storm surge and sea level rise.158 
In the years before Sandy, New York had largely rejected retreat 
measures citing the density of development in the city, the infeasibility 
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of moving infrastructure such as transit and sewer lines, the threat of 
displacing residents, as well as the incompatibility of retreat strategies 
with the PlaNYC goals for coastal development.159 The city does, howev-
er, support an innovative buyout program, the New York Rising Hous-
ing Recovery Program, initiated by New York State Governor Cuomo 
under Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery fund-
ing.160 The initiative is going forward in sections of Staten Island (part 
of New York City) and Suffolk County (east of the city), and combines 
aspects of shoreline protection strategies with encouraging relocation to 
less vulnerable areas,161 in effect, a form of managed retreat. Under the 
plan, which was approved by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the State offers to buy out homeowners in coastal areas 
that sustained extensive damage at pre-storm market values.162 These 
properties would not be rebuilt, but rather developed as wetlands, other 
natural sources of coastal protection against storm action, or as public 
park land.163 Under the State’s proposal, homeowners in areas consid-
ered to be at serious future risk of flooding would be offered an addi-
tional bonus as an incentive to relocate.164 
However, New York City’s support of this measure is an exception 
to its general reluctance to consider retreat initiatives, as mirrored in its 
resilience rhetoric: 
We can embrace our coastline. A strong coastline—with vibrant 
waterfront neighborhoods, critical infrastructure, and cherished 
natural and cultural resources—is essential to New York’s pre-
sent and future. We can fight for and rebuild what was lost, for-
tify the shoreline, and develop waterfront areas for the benefit of 
all New Yorkers. The city cannot, and will not, retreat.165 
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This commitment to coastal development is reflective of local gov-
ernments’ general preference for development that maximizes economic 
returns.166 It also reflects coastal area residents’ attachment to their 
homes and neighborhoods and general reluctance to abandon them.167 
This development preference is facilitated by federal disaster relief poli-
cies that promote rebuilding and replacing preexisting structures rather 
than creating incentives for alternative responses such as managed re-
treat.168 Building up the waterfront, however, requires construction or 
extension of infrastructure and, in turn, necessitates the kind of struc-
tural (hard) armoring strategies discussed in this section.169 Yet, overre-
liance on such strategies is a costly alternative and requires investment 
in maintenance or replacement of these armoring structures.170 Further, 
when these protective measures are breached, coastal buildings, infra-
structure, and residents are put at risk.171 
Recognizing the practical difficulties entailed in using retreat 
strategies in a developed urban area, the costs and risks of promoting 
further waterfront development in flood-prone areas, including a sus-
tained campaign to rebuild storm-damaged properties, counsel in favor 
of further consideration of additional forms of managed retreat as a 
strategy of resilience for New York City. 
V. THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF WEATHER DISASTER: WHAT 
THE CITY SHOULD DO 
Data and ideas proliferate about how coastal cities, and in particu-
lar New York City, can pursue strategies of resilience to help withstand 
the next weather-related onslaught and fulfill its responsibilities to pro-
tect those living and working within its borders. The needed responses 
go beyond land-use measures and require upgraded emergency systems, 
including effective communications strategies that can be mobilized be-
fore an extreme weather event to better implement evacuation initia-
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tives and that can function even after power sources are compromised, 
as well as adequate shelter and housing options that reflect the city’s 
density and the complicated needs of its vulnerable populations.172 At a 
minimum, what is needed is an overall approach to planning that incor-
porates the core elements of systems resilience173 and considers a full 
range of approaches to climate change adaptation, including managed 
coastal retreat where it is feasible.174 At the same time, a city’s approach 
to developing resilience measures should be informed by the social fac-
tors that can affect vulnerability and the capacity for human resilience, 
including financial and social capital, race, age, gender, and disabil-
ity.175 
In the developing field of vulnerability studies, scholars address the 
intersection of the physical/meteorological and the social/economic.176 
Sociologist Kathleen Tierney discusses three “axes of inequality,” social 
class, race and ethnicity, and gender, as key determinants of vulnerabil-
ity and resilience in the face of an impending disaster calling for evacua-
tion.177 Social class and access to resources generally position some indi-
viduals as more vulnerable in a disaster because they are more likely to 
be renters with less control over housing arrangements, their housing is 
more likely to be inadequate, they may have difficulty accessing reliable 
transportation in the event of the need to evacuate, fewer viable shelter 
options upon evacuation, and difficulty qualifying for household disaster 
assistance if part of a combined or extended household.178 
Race and ethnicity also affect vulnerability to disaster and capacity 
for resilience.179 Thus, communities comprising racial minorities and 
immigrant groups may have less trust of official directives concerning 
evacuation, and concern about what might eventuate if they comply 
(separation and loss of household goods and documentation).180 Lan-
guage minorities also may be disproportionately disadvantaged during a 
disaster if warnings are not offered in multiple languages or in an 
equivalent level of detail as official sources.181 Related to race and eth-
nicity and also to class and social capital are the factors of age and isola-
tion,182 as sociologist Eric Klinenberg has documented extensively in his 
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study of the impact of poverty, age, and degree of connection to commu-
nity networks on vulnerability to the effects of a heat wave in Chicago in 
1995.183 Klinenberg’s research revealed how, among lower-income racial 
minority groups, members of African-American and Latino communities 
that otherwise seemed similarly situated in terms of urban location, 
housing arrangements, and income level, showed different levels of vul-
nerability and ability to cope during the heat wave based on whether 
they had access to strong community networks and institutions.184 
Intersecting with these other factors are characteristics associated 
with gender.185 Some research has highlighted how women’s unequal 
access to income and employment opportunities, their frequent role as 
caregivers responsible for minor and elder members of households, and, 
in some situations, their lack of equal authority in a household for mak-
ing decisions concerning how to respond to a disaster or access disaster 
relief, may increase their vulnerability.186 
The experience in New York City during and after Superstorm 
Sandy substantiates the degree to which social factors and social ine-
quality exacerbate vulnerability and affect the capacity for resilience.187 
As noted, public housing residents were among the populations dispro-
portionately affected by the storm because many New York City Hous-
ing Authority buildings are located in flood-prone areas and lost the ca-
pacity to provide heat, hot water, and electricity when critical systems 
were flooded.188 Elderly and disabled residents in these high-rise apart-
ment buildings were particularly affected because they were unable to 
evacuate; instead, they remained stranded in apartments in precarious 
situations with limited access to food and medication, in addition to ex-
posure to the cold.189 Added to these concerns was the New York City 
Housing Authority’s inability to identify in which units many of these 
disabled residents were located.190 It was in this context that the New 
York Resilience System network sprang into action in the beleaguered 
Rockaways, mobilizing representatives of the nonprofit, government, 
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and private sectors to deliver post-Sandy relief,191 and autonomous 
community-based groups such as People’s Relief and the actions of resi-
dents in other housing authority complexes supplemented and at times 
appeared to substitute for the city government’s own capacity to respond 
to these vulnerable residents.192 
The fact that disability is a critical consideration in assessing vul-
nerability and resilience was highlighted in a recent federal district 
court ruling in which the court held that New York City failed to proper-
ly accommodate the needs of disabled residents during emergencies, in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.193 In Brooklyn Center 
for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, a lawsuit commenced in 
2011 after Hurricane Irene, but given added urgency after Superstorm 
Sandy, Judge Jesse Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found that New York City’s emergency prepared-
ness plan had failed to develop adequate evacuation plans for disabled 
persons living in high-rise buildings, and failed to afford access to public 
transportation, the city’s shelter system, or other city services.194 The 
court also concluded that the city failed to plan appropriately for com-
municating with people with disabilities during emergencies.195 High-
lighting the plan’s deficiencies, the court detailed how the city’s emer-
gency plan failed to account for people with disabilities during a power 
failure: 
237. The City's failure to account for people with disabilities 
during a power outage impairs their ability to meaningfully ac-
cess the City's emergency services, such as sheltering, food and 
water distribution, and the provision of medical services]. Be-
cause many people with disabilities depend on elevators, a pow-
er outage renders many people with disabilities unable to leave 
their buildings. Those unable to leave their buildings are obvi-
ously unable to access the City's emergency services, such as 
sheltering, food and water distribution, and the provision of 
medical services. 
238. The City's power outage plan does not account for this. It 
plans for the electric company, and if that fails, the Police De-
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partment, to check on people dependent on electricity-powered 
life-sustaining equipment in the event of a power outage. But 
the City's emergency plans do not require that, where possible, 
the public—or least those who depend on electricity for health, 
safety, or mobility—be notified in advance of a power outage; as 
explained above, the plans do not provide sufficient evacuation 
assistance to ensure that during a power outage, people with 
disabilities can exit their buildings; nor do they call for canvass-
ing after an emergency, to help ensure that the services provid-
ed to people without disabilities may reach those with disabili-
ties who are unable to leave their buildings.196 
The court’s closely detailed discussion reveals the interconnected-
ness and specificity of the needs of disabled people in emergency con-
texts. The decision highlights the degree to which city government and 
its agencies must address these considerations in their resilience plan-
ning to discharge sovereign obligations grounded in law and the impera-
tives of social equity.197 
As Eric Klinenberg has persuasively demonstrated, disasters and 
emergencies draw attention to those who are vulnerable even in the con-
text of day-to-day living as the result of an “impoverished social infra-
structure.”198 Thus, his analysis of vulnerability and resilience points to 
placing the requirements of the social infrastructure on an equal footing 
with the “hard infrastructure of power lines and transit systems and 
communications networks.”199 To be sure, no city can act alone.200 Ra-
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ther, to be resilient, cities need to draw upon the resources of other lev-
els of government as well as the private and non-profit sectors.201 And as 
the experience of New York City has shown, it is also critical for cities to 
mobilize a community-based initiative: taking steps to reinforce the “so-
cial infrastructure” will be a key ingredient of any response,202 one that 
city-level governments should be best situated to accomplish. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Drawing on the experience of New York City during and after Su-
perstorm Sandy in 2012, this article has considered how a coastal city 
can pursue strategies of resilience in the context of climate change and 
weather disasters. It has argued that, to enhance its options for achiev-
ing resilience in relation to future storm surges and inundation, the city 
should consider a nuanced set of responses to ensure that it is address-
ing the social dimensions of disaster as keenly as the hard infrastruc-
ture measures that form the core of its resilience strategy. Relatedly, 
instead of a reflexive reliance on policies that commit to armoring and 
rebuilding the coastline, and further development of the waterfront, 
New York as a coastal city should consider how pursuing alternate 
strategies such as restoring wetlands and maintaining other local eco-
logical systems in flood-prone areas can further the aims of resilience. 
A promising first step is New York City’s support of a New York 
State-funded and -implemented buyout program for particularly vulner-
able property owners that will replace residential structures with wet-
lands and other natural buffers. However, an overall shift in perspective 
is needed to promote a more nuanced, multifaceted way of thinking 
about resilience in the context of climate change that takes into account 
the social-ecological, psychological, and systems dimensions of resilience 
and recognizes how resilience in the era of climate change is crucially 
tied to a city’s social infrastructure. The district court’s close factual 
analysis of vulnerability in Brooklyn Center for Independence of the 
Disabled v. Bloomberg points to the kind of nuanced, fact-sensitive ap-
proach to understanding the needs of vulnerable populations, and the 
social context in which these needs can be met, that resilient cities must 
cultivate. As Eric Klinenberg has recognized, “the best techniques for 
safeguarding cities don’t just mitigate disaster damage; they also 
strengthen the networks that promote health and prosperity during or-
dinary times.”203 
To adopt a resilient approach to extreme weather events, New York 
City cannot stop at armoring its waterfront, buildings, and infrastruc-
ture. Rather, it should draw on the sociological evidence discussed here, 
and build on some of the recommendations it outlined in its After Action 
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Report,204 a more searching but less trumpeted report assessing the 
shortcomings in the city’s approach to community services in emergen-
cies. Under such an approach, it should equally emphasize strengthen-
ing the social networks that extend the capacity of government to sup-
port vulnerable residents and that increase residents’ own capacity to 
recover and function, resiliently. The imperatives of law and social equi-
ty require nothing less. 
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